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PDF(1431 KB)
PDF(1431 KB)
任务或闲聊?——人机交流的极限与聊天机器人的发展路径选择
Task-oriented or Chitchat: The Limitation of Human-Machine Communication and the Choice of Developmental Paths of Chatbots
聊天机器人的出现使人机交互行为(human-machine interaction)进化到“对话模式”,这也激发了人们对于人机之间进行无障碍交流的期待。然而,如果对人类交流的本质稍加分析,不难发现,聊天机器人由于缺乏肉身而无法产生共情,也无法对人类日常生活经验产生存在论意义上的理解。人与机器在物性上的差异是绝对的,这意味着两者之间很难实现完美沟通。不过,作为一种高效率的智能化工具,聊天机器人能够满足人类对于技术服务的刚性需求,其应用和发展前景都极为广阔。考虑到人工智能所带来的伦理安全风险及社会后果,人们应该尽量避免卷入与机器之间的深度社会情感关系,更多地专注于其工具性服务功能。因此,人们应该在技术迷思中认清现实和梦想的差异,并结合预期风险防控而选择聊天机器人的可持续发展路径,由此重启人机对话的新篇章。
The advance of chatbots is evolving the human-machine interaction into the conversational mode, which has also stimulated people’s expectation of barrier-free communication between human and machine. However, when analyzing the essence of human communication, it is not difficult to find that chatbots are unable to develop empathy due to their lack of physical bodies, nor to develop an ontological understanding of the everyday experiences of human beings. The distinct physical differences between human and machine means that angelic communication between them would be barely possible. However, as an intelligent tool with high efficiency, chatbots can satisfy people’s strong demand for technical services, and its application and development prospects are extremely broad. Considering the ethical safety risks and social consequences brought by artificial intelligence, people should try their best to avoid getting involved in the deep social emotional relationship with machines and focus more on their instrumental service functions. Therefore, by recognizing the differences between ideal and reality within the technology myths, people can choose the best way of developing chatbots based on the expected risk prevention and control, and restart the new chapter of human-machine communication.
chatbot / the Limitation of communication / task-oriented / chitchat / path
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This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.
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