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媒介使用对地方政府信任的作用机制研究
Research on Mechanisms of Media Use to Local Governments Trust
本文聚焦媒介使用对政府信任的影响，运用社会网络与职业经历问卷调查数据（JSNET2014），通过探索性因子分析区分出地方政府信任变量，并将媒介使用分为传统媒体使用、互联网使用、知识社群参与三类，在此基础上探讨媒介使用对地方政府信任的正负效应和作用机制。研究发现，传统媒体使用、互联网使用对地方政府信任均有负向显著影响，知识社群参与对地方政府信任没有显著影响。知识社群参与是媒介使用操作化上的创新。本文发现了媒介使用影响政府信任的绩效感知、信息控制、参照群体、认知转型、信任传递机制，对社会治理具有参考和借鉴意义。
This paper focuses on the impact of media use on government trust, using the data from the social network and professional experience questionnaire survey (JSNET 2014), to distinguish local government trust variables through exploratory factor analysis and divide media use into three categories, including traditional media use, Internet use, and knowledge community participation, on the basis of which the positive and negative effects and mechanisms of media use on local government trust are explored. The study finds out that traditional media use and Internet use have negative impact on local government trust and knowledge community participation has no significant impact on local government trust. Knowledge community participation is an innovation in the operationalization of media use. This paper finds out the mechanisms of media use affects government trust, which are performance perception, information control, reference groups, cognitive transition and trust transfer, and this has reference and implications for social governance.
Government trust / traditional media / internet / knowledge community participation
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