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平台·公会·主播:不确定数字产业中的生产组织
Platforms, Guilds, Livestreamers: Production Organization in Uncertain Digital Industry
算法转向影响媒体行业,加剧创意产业的不确定性和商品化。作为一个数字内容产业,网络直播面对何种市场环境?关键行动者如何组织内容生产?本研究将人类数字生产活动置于理解社会过程的中心,以网络直播行业为传播政治经济学研究提供中国案例。研究综合采用内容分析、深度访谈和民族志方法,分析以平台、公会和主播为代表的直播行业关键行动者,在不确定的市场环境中获得地位和结果的过程和机制。网络直播是独特性与共同性两个特点之间博弈的集体艺术生产活动,直播公会对内组织生产(招募、培训和管理)、对外管理可见性(运营、导流与打榜),呈现出平台背书、系统组织、人机合作和劳务中介的特征,完成对于可见性的追求以获得地位。
The algorithmic-turn has transformed the media sector, accelerating the uncertainty and commodification of the creative industry. As a digital content industry, what kind of market environment is the live-streaming sector facing? How do key actors organize the entire content production? This study places human digital production activities at the focal point for understanding social processes, and uses the Internet live-streaming industry to provide a case study on platform for research in the field of political economy of communication. Using a combination of content analysis, in-depth interviews and ethnographies, this study analyzes the process and mechanism through which key actors in the live-streaming industry, represented by platforms, guilds and live-streamers, gain status and achievements in the midst of an uncertain market environment. Internet live-streaming is a collective creative production activity that has to balance between the unique and the general, and live-streamers’ guilds organize production internally (recruitment, training and management) and manage visibility externally (operation, traffic acquisition and listing promotion) manifesting the characteristics of platform accreditation, systemic organization, human-machine cooperation, and labor agency to accomplish the quest for visibility and gain status.
网络主播 / 公会 / 数字生产组织 / 可见性 / 不确定性
live streamer / guild / digital production organization / visibility / uncertainty
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Algorithms are said to affect social realities, often in unseen ways. This article explores conscious, instrumental interactions with algorithms, as a window into the complexities and extent of algorithmic power. Through a thematic analysis of online discussions among Instagram influencers, I observed that influencers’ pursuit of influence resembles a game constructed around “rules” encoded in algorithms. Within the “visibility game,” influencers’ interpretations of Instagram’s algorithmic architecture—and the “game” more broadly—act as a lens through which to view and mechanize the rules of the game. Illustrating this point, this article describes two prominent interpretations, which combine information influencers glean about Instagram’s algorithms with preexisting discourses within influencer communities on authenticity and entrepreneurship. This article shows how directing inquiries toward the visibility game makes present the interdependency between users, algorithms, and platform owners and demonstrates how algorithms structure, but do not unilaterally determine user behavior.
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In attempting to break with a ‘fall from grace’ narrative that may structure analysis of the rapid professionalization and monetization of previously amateur online video content on the main global platform, YouTube, this article outlines histories of key institutions in the new screen ecology as outcomes of the increased interpenetration of very different, often clashing industry cultures. Google/YouTube, Apple’s iTunes, Netflix, Amazon, Yahoo! and Facebook (‘NoCal’) are largely Internet ‘pure-play’ companies, whilst Hollywood’s incumbents (‘SoCal’) practice time-honoured mass media and premium content strategies. The ‘history of the present’ of the new screen ecology is the history of the clash of these cultures. The less than 10-year history of Google’s YouTube can be written as a history of Google seeking to come to terms with the conditions of possibility for entertainment, content and talent development from its base as an IT company dedicated to scale, automation, permanent beta, rapid prototyping and iteration. These efforts reflect both continuities and contestations with traditional media models, particularly business models. As emerging intermediaries in the middle of the convergent space between NoCal and SoCal, multichannel networks’ (MCNs’) placement sees them needing to innovate on both the NoCal and SoCal side. On the former side, MCNs are attempting to provide value-added services superior to basic YouTube analytics, with programmatics and pioneering attempts at management of scale and volume. On the latter side, they are managing a quite different class of entry- to mid-level talent, who bring successful audience development and clear ideas about the roots of their success with them. The new screen ecology is a space of unimagined scale and scope of flourishing online creativity and culture, which is at the same time turbulent and precarious for creators and MCNs alike.
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1. 礼物打赏:用户花钱在网络直播平台充值购买虚拟货币,并用虚拟货币购买直播平台提供的虚拟礼物赠送给主播。
2. IT桔子是泛互联网行业结构化的创投数据库和商业信息服务商,基于数据、文本、新闻等多维度信息,搭建有关公司、产品、人物、投资者等行动者的数据平台。
3. “千播大战”指2015年至2016年期间,中国出现百余款直播软件,市场竞争激烈。
4. 由于国资背景的申请限制,网络视听证成为稀缺品,2017年持牌的壳公司价格达3500万(孙妍,
5. 互联网企业中快手是最大的直播平台,另有百度、阿里、腾讯、字节跳动、Bilibili等代表企业。
6. “大型投资机构”定义为单次参投金额大于1000万,投资次数超过2次的机构。
7. 包括个人投资和匿名投资机构。
8. 公会起初是平台头部主播牵头成立,可以视为半专业化的、过渡状态的经纪公司。2012年4月,《征途2》天赐一个月内在YY平台刷了1000多万元礼物,同时带动大批网游界“土豪”参与。两个月后天赐成立皇族公会,将大批人气主播招揽至麾下,从礼物打赏中抽取分成。后续China公会、娱加、IR等知名公会先后涌现,逐渐形成当前公会的商业模式(GQ,
9. 大、中、小规模的公会主要以收录主播人数为衡量标准,大公会中主播人数大于1万名,中公会中主播人数为1000-10000名,小公会中主播人数小于1000名。虽然S公会旗下主播数量不多,但流量主播比例高,在业界影响力较大。
10. MC是“microphone controller”的缩写,指“麦克风的掌控者”,原指饶舌歌手(Rapper)。
11. 如腾讯与斗鱼曾经联合发布公开信表示,不允许违约跳槽主播在直播过程中通过腾讯旗下的任何一款游戏直播获利(南方都市报,
12. 麦时全称为上麦时间,指网络主播的直播时长。
13. R指revenue,收入。
14. 分成比例可能依公会规模发生变动,一般平台得到打赏收入的40%-50%;此外主播的走红程度也影响议价权,可能占余下收入的40%-60%。
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