隐私作为不被打扰的权利或者控制个人信息传播的权利在与其信息社会的诸多对 手（比如安全、效率、创新）的抗衡中一直处于牺牲者的位置，以致于传统意义上 的隐私权经常被看作是一种过时的价值。自由主义隐私理论及其所建立的“通知与选 择”隐私政策模式长期以来预设了一个不切实际的隐私主体，隐私的存在只是为了保 护一种特定自我观念，隐私权也只是一些更重要的自由权利的衍生品。本文认为，在 监视社会不断扩张的今天，隐私的主体应该是一种根植于其文化和历史脉络的并被不 断建构的自我，隐私权所关照的是这一主体在监视社会中不被透视和不被预测的自 由，这对于当下和未来的隐私政策与法律应该有重要的启示。

Privacy as the right to be left alone or the right to control the ?ow of personal information has long been sacrificed when balanced against the cutting-edge imperatives of security, effciency, and innovation—so much so that privacy is often cast as an anachronistic value. Liberal privacy theory and the “notice and choice” model established on such theoretical foundation presuppose a fixed, one-dimensional, and unrealistic liberal self, which privacy then seeks to preserve. The right to privacy so characterized is only to preserve other important liberties such as intellectual and expressive freedoms. This article argues that, against the backdrop of the rapidly expanding modern surveillance society, the subject of privacy ought to be a situated and embodied self who is constructed by its social and cultural context; privacy shelters this subject from the surveillance power that seeks to render individuals and communities transparent and predictable. This should have important implications for information law and policy in the coming surveillance age.