我国自2005年至今一直在大力整治虚假违法广告，但迄今为止的结果表明了广告行政监管的失
灵。既有研究多认为是法律体系不周或行政执法不严所致。本文结合公共选择理论，分析了我国广告
行政监管长期普遍存在的三大特征：选择性执法、运动式治理和便宜式执法，证明政府私利及相应
的控权不足是导致我国广告监管政府失灵的深层次原因。论文最后提出了向私法自治转型的解决思
路。

Advertising regulation in China is absolutely dominated by government. Long-existing,
widespread and serious illegal advertising indicates government failure in this field. One of the most
important reasons for this failure lies in authorities’ pursuing self-interest. Based on the Public Choice
Theory, this paper explores the three features of advertising law-enforcement in China: campaign-style
regulation, selective enforcement of law, and enforcement to facilitate administration, and proves that
the governmental self-interest without effective power-control mechanism is the deep-rooted cause of
government failure in advertising regulation. In the end, it proposes to develop civil-oriented system of
advertising governance.