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国家平台的“中间”治理与乡村社会交往秩序变革——基于湘西州村干部平台使用的经验研究
Governance of Intermediation in the State’s Digital Platform Expansion to Rural Areas: An Empirical Study of Village Cadres’ Use of Government Platforms in Xiangxi Autonomous Prefecture
村干部是国家与乡村社会互动的“中间者”。国家政务平台下乡往往需要村干部对接执行。基于对湘西州政务“平台下乡”过程及村干部平台使用的实践经验研究，本研究发现：村干部需“承包”国家的信息收集、平台下载等数字任务，村干部出现屏幕化趋势。平台界面结构固定了村干部作为国家代理人的身份，国家标准化的数字类型嵌入乡村治理体系，形成乡村社会的清晰治理。国家与村干部的互动本质是国家与乡村社会的互动。国家通过平台与村干部互动形成更为制度化的乡村社会交往秩序，这是国家平台的“中间”治理。但平台下乡过程中也出现乡村社会“数字形式主义”“数字悬浮”等问题。本研究旨在对村干部平台使用的经验进行研究或创新数字时代国家乡村治理理论与实践。
Village cadres are intermediaries in the interaction between the state and rural society. The implementation of national government platforms in rural areas often relies on village leaders for coordination and execution. Based on field research on the implementation of government service platforms in rural areas in Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, this study found that village cadres are tasked with handling state’s digital tasks, such as national information collection and platform downloading, and there is a trend towards screen-based approaches for village cadres. The platform interface fixes the identity of village cadres as state agents, and the state’s standardized digital formats are embedded in the rural governance system, enhancing governance clarity. The essence of the interaction between the state and village cadres is the interaction between the state and rural society, which is mediated by national platforms. The state interacts with village cadres through platforms to form a more structured rural social interaction order. However, during the process of platforms reaching rural areas, there have also been issues such as “digital formalism” and “digital suspension” in rural society. This study aims to investigate the experience of using village cadre platforms and promote the theory and practice of national rural governance in the digital age.
村干部 / 政务平台 / 平台治理 / 数字乡村治理 / 数字下乡
Village cadres / government affairs platform / platforms governance / digital rural governance / digital going to the countryside
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1. 来源于访谈对象，单位为年。
2. 2021年访谈。作为基层女干部，其曾接受国家新闻机构的访谈，为远近闻名的“乡村能人”。2022年后，PYH已是乡镇干部。
3. 2015年至2019年担任村主任，2021年至今担任村书记兼村主任。
4. C1为X县县委组织部人员，负责县组织部村干部数字技能的培训等，其曾作为选调生驻村2年。
5. 2021年12月29日，曾为A村驻村干部PS。为了解湘西州政务平台下乡变化趋势，研究员曾分别于20220年3月、2023年6月及2024年6月18日对PS进行了多次深度访谈。
6. 2014年至2017年担任村主任；2019年至今担任村党支部书记兼村主任。
7. 由于TMR很早就开始担任村干部，其已无法记得精确的时间，只记得大概。从最初担任村会计开始计算。2020年换届后，TMR退休。
8. 原在企业工作，后辞职成为乡镇干部，从事茶叶种植、加工等。
9. 一般而言由年纪轻、擅长使用电脑、手机等新媒体的村干部完成数字任务。但近年来，随着数字乡村社会的趋势，村干部还需进行数字技能培训以进行数字办公。
10. 来源于访谈对象政务平台的使用情况，不完全统计。
11. 本研究中的服务型平台指的是未强制性要求村干部执行数字任务的平台；而任务型平台指的是强制性要求村干部执行数字任务的平台。
12. 2023年以来，湘西州“学习强国”已从任务型平台转变为服务型平台，不再强制村干部考核。
13. 2022年以来，因地方政府和村干部向上提出意见建议，基层已暂停使用“道交安”。
14. 2023年以来，基层减负的大环境下，上级已不再严格考核任务。
15. 同14。
16. 此种情况发生在湘西州尚未实行基层减负阶段，如2020到2022年期间。
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