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从规训到控制：算法社会的技术幽灵与底层战术
From Discipline Society to Control Society: The Specter of Technology and Consumer Practice in an Algorithmic Society
本文将批判性和经验性的注意力集中于算法受众的抵抗战术上，并将其置于控制社会的技术背景中去分析。算法社会呈现出弱空间化、重预测性与分体性的特点，看似为个体打造了个性化的专属服务，但实质是用一套极其单一的标准代码征服着世界，将用户需求精准置入代码运算中，最大范围的取消偏离常规的民间实践。当算法性能无法提供良好的用户体验时，受众开始构建自己的战术实践空间，对算法文本进行逃离、重组、嵌入与反噬等一系列“底层运作”。受众抵抗战术作为一种底层政治迥异于上层技术政治规则的固有形式，以一种体制外的方式发生作用，处于技术活动认定的正规活动的可见光谱之外。然而，对于算法社会的受众来说，没有绝对的偏离，任何偏离都是新形式的参与，是另一种形式的链接。算法通过“技术包容”与“参与文化”将用户锁定在平台提供的服务与规则中，个体被技术进行征服、定义和重塑，并给参与者更加社交的幻觉，用户自以为聪明的抵抗实质变成了一种自我强化的不平等。
This research focuses critical and empirical attention on the resistance tactics of algorithm audiences in the control society. The algorithm society presents the characteristics of weak spatialization, heavy predictability, and dividuality. It seems to create personalized and independent exclusive content and services for individuals, but the essence is to conquer the world with a set of extremely single standard codes. Precisely put user needs into the code calculation, in this way, the largest range of deviations from conventional folk practices can be eliminated. When the performance of the algorithm cannot provide a good user experience, the audience begins to build their own tactical practice space, and a series of “low-level operations” such as escaping, reorganizing, embedding and backlashing the algorithm text. Audience resistance tactics, as an inherent form of low-level politics that is very different from the rules of upper-level technology and politics, acting in a way outside the visible spectrum of formal activities recognized by technical activities. However, there is no absolute deviation in the algorithm (control) society. Any deviation is a new form of participation. Users are locked in the services and rules provided by the platform through “technical tolerance” and “participation culture”. Individuals are conquered, defined and reshaped by technology, which looks like giving participants a more social illusion. Users think they are smart and they resist. In essence, it has become a self-reinforcing inequality.
algorithm / Deleuze / the society of control / resistance tactics / Michel de Certeau
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Over the last 30 years or so, human beings have been delegating the work of culture – the sorting, classifying and hierarchizing of people, places, objects and ideas – increasingly to computational processes. Such a shift significantly alters how the category culture has long been practiced, experienced and understood, giving rise to what, following Alexander Galloway, I am calling ‘algorithmic culture’. The purpose of this essay is to trace some of the conceptual conditions out of which algorithmic culture has emerged and, in doing so, to offer a preliminary treatment on what it is. In the vein of Raymond Williams’ Keywords, I single out three terms whose bearing on the meaning of the word culture seems to have been unusually strong during the period in question: information, crowd and algorithm. My claim is that the offloading of cultural work onto computers, databases and other types of digital technologies has prompted a reshuffling of some of the words most closely associated with culture, giving rise to new senses of the term that may be experientially available but have yet to be well named, documented or recorded. This essay, though largely historical, concludes by connecting the dots critically to the present day. What is at stake in algorithmic culture is the gradual abandonment of culture’s publicness and the emergence of a strange new breed of elite culture purporting to be its opposite.
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1. 受访者编号举例如下：10LC-M-高级工程师（访问序号/部分姓名首字母-性别：男-职业），26MM-FM-商场职员-日志D3（访问序号/部分姓名首字母-性别：女-职业-记录个人网络体验日志的第3天）。
2. Pinterest是世界上最大的图片社交分享网站，采用瀑布流的形式展现图片内容，无需用户翻页，新的图片不断自动加载在页面底端，让用户不断的发现新的图片。
3. 详细内容见“抖音”隐私政策“1.1注册、登 录、认证”“1.2播放浏览”等。
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