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Attitudes Polarization and False Consensus in Online Public Opinion
MA Deyong, HUANG Minxuan
Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (7) : 47-73.
PDF(1680 KB)
PDF(1680 KB)
Attitudes Polarization and False Consensus in Online Public Opinion
Existing studies on public opinion patterns in China generally find polarization within online public opinion. However, these studies stay at the level of descriptive analysis and pay less attention to the underlying formation mechanisms. Based on the 2021 Chinese Netizens Survey, this study analyses whether polarization of public opinion exists and its underlying causal mechanism. Contrary to prior findings, the results show that the structural attitudes of Chinese netizens is not bimodal but a unimodal distribution, of which the position of netizens on domestic controversial topics is relatively neutral and mild, and the attitude on diplomatic topics is a one-sided “strongly support” of the government’s position. Moreover, there are widespread “false consensus” effects in overestimating the proportion of the actual opinions held by others with individuals holding more extreme attitudes showing more “false consensus”. In terms of the formation mechanism, authoritarian personality, ideology, and media exposure can significantly predict the polarization of people’s attitudes, but the false consensus is the internal drive of attitude polarization. While contributing greater insight to public opinion in China, the research results also have significance for the construction of healthy and normal public opinion in China.
polarization of public opinion / false consensus / political ideology / authoritarian personality / media use
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Ideological belief systems arise from epistemic, existential, and relational motives to reduce uncertainty, threat, and social discord. According to system justification theory, however, some ideologies-such as those that are conservative, religious, and legitimizing of the status quo-are especially appealing to people whose epistemic, existential, and relational motives are chronically or temporarily heightened. In this article, we focus on relational motivation, describing evidence that conservatives are more likely than liberals to: prioritize values of conformity and tradition; possess a strong desire to share reality with like-minded others; perceive within-group consensus when making political and non-political judgments; be influenced by implicit relational cues and sources who are perceived as similar to them; and maintain homogenous social networks and favor an 'echo chamber' environment that is conducive to the spread of misinformation.Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r =.50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.
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Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty- threat model of political conservatism, which posits that psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models, which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only. Study 3 also reveals that resistance to change fully mediates the association between uncertainty avoidance and conservatism, whereas opposition to equality partially mediates the association between threat and conservatism. Implications for understanding the epistemic and existential bases of political orientation are discussed.
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Does the consumption of ideologically congruent news on social media exacerbate polarization? I estimate the effects of social media news exposure by conducting a large field experiment randomly offering participants subscriptions to conservative or liberal news outlets on Facebook. I collect data on the causal chain of media effects: subscriptions to outlets, exposure to news on Facebook, visits to online news sites, and sharing of posts, as well as changes in political opinions and attitudes. Four main findings emerge. First, random variation in exposure to news on social media substantially affects the slant of news sites that individuals visit. Second, exposure to counter-attitudinal news decreases negative attitudes toward the opposing political party. Third, in contrast to the effect on attitudes, I find no evidence that the political leanings of news outlets affect political opinions. Fourth, Facebook’s algorithm is less likely to supply individuals with posts from counter-attitudinal outlets, conditional on individuals subscribing to them. Together, the results suggest that social media algorithms may limit exposure to counter-attitudinal news and thus increase polarization. (JEL C93, D72, L82)
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Much of the literature on polarization and selective exposure presumes that the internet exacerbates the fragmentation of the media and the citizenry. Yet this ignores how the widespread use of social media changes news consumption. Social media provide readers a choice of stories from different sources that come recommended from politically heterogeneous individuals, in a context that emphasizes social value over partisan affiliation. Building on existing models of news selectivity to emphasize information utility, we hypothesize that social media’s distinctive feature, social endorsements, trigger several decision heuristics that suggest utility. In two experiments, we demonstrate that stronger social endorsements increase the probability that people select content and that their presence reduces partisan selective exposure to levels indistinguishable from chance.
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The Big Five personality traits have been linked to dozens of life outcomes. However, metascientific research has raised questions about the replicability of behavioral science. The Life Outcomes of Personality Replication (LOOPR) Project was therefore conducted to estimate the replicability of the personality-outcome literature. Specifically, I conducted preregistered, high-powered (median N = 1,504) replications of 78 previously published trait-outcome associations. Overall, 87% of the replication attempts were statistically significant in the expected direction. The replication effects were typically 77% as strong as the corresponding original effects, which represents a significant decline in effect size. The replicability of individual effects was predicted by the effect size and design of the original study, as well as the sample size and statistical power of the replication. These results indicate that the personality-outcome literature provides a reasonably accurate map of trait-outcome associations but also that it stands to benefit from efforts to improve replicability.
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In three studies, we examined (a) whether conservatives possess a stronger desire to share reality than liberals and are therefore more likely to perceive consensus with politically like-minded others even for non-political judgments and, if so, (b) whether motivated perceptions of consensus would give conservatives an edge in progressing toward collective goals. In Study 1, participants estimated ingroup consensus on non-political judgments. Conservatives perceived more ingroup consensus than liberals, regardless of the amount of actual consensus. The desire to share reality mediated the relationship between ideology and perceived ingroup consensus. Study 2 replicated these results and demonstrated that perceiving ingroup consensus predicted a sense of collective efficacy in politics. In Study 3, experimental manipulations of affiliative motives eliminated ideological differences in the desire to share reality. A sense of collective efficacy predicted intentions to vote in a major election. Implications for the attainment of shared goals are discussed.
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In two studies, we demonstrated that liberals underestimate their similarity to other liberals (i.e., display truly false uniqueness), whereas moderates and conservatives overestimate their similarity to other moderates and conservatives (i.e., display truly false consensus; Studies 1 and 2). We further demonstrated that a fundamental difference between liberals and conservatives in the motivation to feel unique explains this ideological distinction in the accuracy of estimating similarity (Study 2). Implications of the accuracy of consensus estimates for mobilizing liberal and conservative political movements are discussed.
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This article reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship between social media and political polarization. We argue that social media shapes polarization through the following social, cognitive, and technological processes: partisan selection, message content, and platform design and algorithms.Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. 有学者指出，普通民众的态度极化可能呈现三模态（Trimodal）的分布形态，既有的峰度测量对三模态的分布并不敏感，由此容易导致对民意数据中态度极化的误读，但遗憾的是作者未能提出测量三模态的方法。具体参见Downey D. J., & Huffman, M. L. (2001). Attitudinal polarization and trimodal distributions: Measurement problems and theoretical implications. Social Science Quarterly, 82(3), 494-505.
2. 运用这一测量方法进行极化现象分析的研究具体参见Kaya, Y., & Sunar, L. (2015). The culture wars redux? The polarization of social and political attitudes in Turkey. Social Currents, 2(4), 393-412.
3. 双峰系数的测量具体参见Lelkes Y. (
4. 极化指数的测量具体参见Lee, F. L. (2016). Impact of social media on opinion polarization in varying times. Communication and the Public, 1(1), 56-71.
5. 境内媒体因子分析结果为KMO和Bartlett检验：0.87，p<0.001，方差贡献率为39.5%。境外媒体因子分析结果为KMO和Bartlett检验：0.5，p<0.001，方差贡献率为90.4%。
6. 具体参见马得勇，张曙霞（2014）。中国网民的“左”与“右”。《二十一世纪》，（2），86-103。
7. 具体测量指标为：“即使父母的要求不合理，子女也应该照办”“服从自己的上司或地位比自己高的人是理所当然的”“国家领袖的肖像权不能随意用在讽刺漫画里”“大家的想法若不一致，社会就混乱”“街道两边的店铺招牌，整齐划一比参差不齐更美观”以及“对那些批评和辱骂国家领袖的人必须予以严惩”的看法，备选项为强烈反对、反对、中立或不确定、同意以及非常同意，赋值为1-5。因子分析结果为KMO和Bartlett检验：0.718，p<0.001，方差贡献率为45.3%。
8. （1）政治面貌为虚拟变量，1=党员，0=非党员；（2）性别为虚拟变量，1=男性，0=女性；（3）年收入是通过询问受访者的年收入情况，备选项为“5万元以下”“5-10万”“10-20万”“20-60万”“60万以上”，赋值为1-5，数值越大表示年收入越高；（4）年龄是通过询问受访者的实际年龄，将年龄划分为“18-24岁”“25-29岁”“30-34岁”“35-39岁”“40-44岁”“45-49岁”“50-54岁”“55-60岁”“60岁以上”，赋值为1-9，数值越大表示年龄越大；（5）教育程度是通过询问受访者的受教育程度，备选项为“初中及以下”“高中”“本专科”以及“硕博士”，赋值为1-4，数值越大表示教育程度越高；（6）政治兴趣：原始题目为“总体来说，您对政治类新闻感兴趣吗”，备选项为完全没兴趣、不太感兴趣、一般、比较有兴趣、非常感兴趣，赋值为1-5，数值越大表示兴趣越大。
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