Mainstream Media Use, Official Ideological Stance and Popular Political Support: An Empirical Test of Chinese Netizens’ Political Attitudes Based on a Moderated Mediation Effect Model

YE Jie

Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (11) : 105-126.

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Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (11) : 105-126.
Research Articles

Mainstream Media Use, Official Ideological Stance and Popular Political Support: An Empirical Test of Chinese Netizens’ Political Attitudes Based on a Moderated Mediation Effect Model

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Abstract

Relying on the theory of media political communication, this paper explores the influence mechanism of Chinese mainstream media use on popular political support, constructs a moderated mediating effect model, and conducts empirical analysis through large-sample netizen survey data. It is found that, firstly, the positive path of mainstream media use to popular political support is partly mediated by shaping the official ideological position of users. Secondly, authoritarian obedience personality weakens the mediating role of mainstream media users’ official ideological positions. Thirdly, the relationship between mainstream media use, users’ ideological positions and popular political support is heterogeneous. In the future, it is necessary to introduce cutting-edge political communication theories, build a more detailed analysis framework, and deepen the research on the mechanism of popular political support used by Chinese mainstream media.

Key words

Authoritarian subordination to personality / political communication / substitution effect / discourse system

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YE Jie. Mainstream Media Use, Official Ideological Stance and Popular Political Support: An Empirical Test of Chinese Netizens’ Political Attitudes Based on a Moderated Mediation Effect Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication. 2023, 45(11): 105-126

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Footnotes

1. 比如,新中国建立后,在国力非常弱小的情况下,党和政府还是努力将人民日报和中央人民广播电台等媒体布置到包括偏远地区的基层村社和社会单元,确保民众能及时接收到党的最新方针政策。

2. 《战国策.秦策二》中关于“曾参杀人”的描述,就是心理暗示累积效应的典型事例。

3. 主流媒体使用虽然只有三个题项,但也符合“两个取均值,三个做因子分析”的惯例。

4. 当然也有可能包括不在本研究理论模型中的其它路径的作用。

5. 限于篇幅,此处未展示F值等相关检验结果,如有兴趣,可与作者联系。

Funding

Social Science Fund Project “Policy Effect of Provincial Direct Administrative County on Basic Public Services of County Governments”(22JZD028)
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