Ideological positions, sentiment, attention and selective exposure: analysis of the factors of public opinion polarization

Tang Jingtai, Xu Mingliang, Xing Chen

Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (1) : 132-156.

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Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (1) : 132-156.
Research Articles

Ideological positions, sentiment, attention and selective exposure: analysis of the factors of public opinion polarization

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Abstract

Polarization is a key problem in the study of group interaction. In order to explore the mechanism of public opinion polarization, this paper takes typical events in the COVID-19 epidemic as an example, integrates various computational methods, analyzes the polarization phenomenon from the perspectives of ideological positions, emotion, attention and other paths, and examines the mechanism of selective exposure and its influencing factors. The research found that public opinion topics are constantly changing, but the public has a preference for homogeneous and popular content, and the public attention is dominated by a single topic in the short term. Behind the change in topic is the clash of liberalism, populism and statism positions. The popularity and ideology of information have different influences on the selective exposure mechanism. The statism will strengthen this mechanism and show the effect of social integration, while the liberalism and populism will weaken this mechanism and seize the discourse space to strengthen itself. Finally, the intensity of selective exposure can predict short-term changes in public attention, which is of great significance for understanding how the process of information transmission affects the evolution of macro public opinion.

Key words

ideological positions / polarization / selective exposure / public attention

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Tang Jingtai , Xu Mingliang , Xing Chen. Ideological positions, sentiment, attention and selective exposure: analysis of the factors of public opinion polarization[J]. Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication. 2023, 45(1): 132-156

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Footnotes

1. Word2Vec模型的具体参数为:使用100维向量长度、20次循环迭代次数以及筛选出现次数5次以上的词汇作为模型参数进行训练。并选择最为普遍的“向量余弦夹角”作为相似度计算依据。

2. 例如,内容为“……我相信一个强大的国家不会因为一本书的出版就坍塌掉,一个自信的政府也不会因为一本书就无端地指责作家……”的这条微博通过Word2Vec词嵌入模型后得到一串长达100维的语义向量。该向量分别同三类意识形态形态(关键词)的语义向量进行余弦夹角的均值计算(相似度计算常用方法),得到该内容与国家利益、民粹、自由权利三种意识形态的相似度分别为0.86、0.75、0.68,最后将该数值视作其意识形态倾向的量化结果。

3. 主成分分析PCA(principal component analysis)是一种常见的数据分析方法。其常用于高维数据的降维处理,可提取数据的主要特征分量。此处使用该方法目的在于将高维的语义空间向量,降维成二维的平面空间向量,以便对数据进行可视化呈现与后续的研究观察。

4. 使用K-means聚类算法对词汇的空间向量进行自动聚类。其中,聚类结果的优劣依据其“轮廓系数”值进行判定。系数曲线表明,在多个聚类循环中,类别数K=4时聚类结果最优。

5. 整体微博样本中存在较多“无意义”或“无法识别”讨论内容。例如不带文字的转发微博、使用符号表情包的转发微博等,其识别难度、成本极高。且严格来说这类样本不属于常规的信息转发行为。因此本文通过判断文本中的无意义词汇、无意义符号、内容字数等限制条件,对微博内容进行筛选,仅保留可分析、有价值的微博样本。最终筛选出2101个处于正常讨论状态的微博转发关系。

6. 帕累托曲线可以较为清晰的判断不同情况下某数值积累受到其“头部”因素影响的程度。上述帕累托图呈现出在“发生信息选择性接触与否”的两种情况下,微博总转发量受到头部热门信息影响的程度差异。

Funding

“Risk Communication and Effectiveness Evaluation in Public Crises”(20AXW008)
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