PDF(1819 KB)
US Attitudes and Cognitions Regarding China on Twitter: From the Perspective of Political Spectrum
YANG Fan, NIU Yaohong
Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2022, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (6) : 50-70.
PDF(1819 KB)
PDF(1819 KB)
US Attitudes and Cognitions Regarding China on Twitter: From the Perspective of Political Spectrum
International public opinion of China has become more negative recent years across many advanced economies, which has become a hindrance to reform, developments, and stability in China, as well as its global presence. Enhancing the international communication of Chinese culture is one way to improve this situation. Microtargeting like creating finely honed messages targeted at niche audiences is an important means to reach this goal. Due to the widespread phenomenon of political polarization in western societies, we propose an audience analysis approach based on the perspective of the political spectrum. This study examines three prominent ideologies in the United States and their attitudes and cognitions regarding China: the Christian right, economic populists and political and cultural populists. Our findings indicate that the Christian right pay less attention to China, the economic populists are concerned more about human rights violations, and the political and cultural populists develop a hostile mood and ideological bias against China.
international communication / political microtargeting / audience analysis / populism / computational communication
| [1] |
曹强, 王迎春(2018). “亚太再平衡”战略回顾与亚太地缘政治前瞻. 《东疆学刊》,(3),61-67.
|
| [2] |
陈先红, 宋发枝(2020). “讲好中国故事”:国家立场、话语策略与传播战略. 《现代传播(中国传媒大学学报)》,(1),40-46.
|
| [3] |
翟东升(2019). 从地区价值链到亚洲命运共同体——国际政治经济学视角下的中国崛起和东亚复兴. 《教学与研究》,(6),65-75.
|
| [4] |
冯钺(2019). 冲突与优越感并存的西方文明观. 《人民论坛》,(26),39-41.
|
| [5] |
胡智锋, 刘俊(2013). 主体·诉求·渠道·类型:四重维度论如何提高中国传媒的国际传播力. 《新闻与传播研究》,(4),5-24.
|
| [6] |
李晓, 李俊久(2015). “一带一路”与中国地缘政治经济战略的重构. 《世界经济与政治》,(10),30-59.
|
| [7] |
梁孝(2020). 美国对华新遏制战略的目标、实质和根源. 《南通大学学报(社会科学版)》,(2),43-49.
|
| [8] |
刘国强, 汤志豪(2018). 世界精神与民族关怀:全球化时代的跨文化传播伦理构建. 《国际新闻界》,(12),104-121.
|
| [9] |
刘骞(2021). 基督教新右翼对美国政治决策的影响模式. 《社会科学家》,(1),48-52.
|
| [10] |
龙锦(2019). 正视问题寻求共识守正创新——全球转型期世界学者对跨文化传播及人才培养的思考与实践. 《新闻与传播研究》,(3),119-126.
|
| [11] |
逄增玉(2018). 当代中国文化国际传播的现状与路径述论. 《现代传播(中国传媒大学学报)》,(5),14-20.
|
| [12] |
宋国友(2017). 美国孤立主义新发展及其对全球化的影响. 《人民论坛》,(16),24-31.
|
| [13] |
苏林森(2018). 美国人眼中的东方巨龙:涉华新闻关注与美国人对中国的认知、态度的关系. 《国际新闻界》,(5),98-111.
|
| [14] |
隋璐怡(2020). 后真相时代美国总统特朗普及内阁政要推特舆论传播分析及启示, 《全球传媒学刊》,(2),66-86.
|
| [15] |
王庚年(2013年09月12日). 中国国际传播的现状和发展趋势. 《人民日报》,A7.
|
| [16] |
王文, 贾晋京, 关照宇(2020). 后疫情时代,中国形象传播方式急需改革. 《对外传播》,(3),23-25.
|
| [17] |
王昀, 陈先红(2019). 迈向全球治理语境的国家叙事:“讲好中国故事”的互文叙事模型. 《新闻与传播研究》,(7),17-32.
|
| [18] |
温乃楠, 郝晓鸣, 魏然(2014). 国际新闻中的“中国形象”:与中国相关的民意调查的新闻报道. 《传播与社会学刊》(香港),(30),71-95.
|
| [19] |
吴飞(2019). 共情传播的理论基础与实践路径探索. 《新闻与传播研究》,(5),59-76.
|
| [20] |
吴心伯(2020). 论中美战略竞争. 《世界经济与政治》,(5),96-130.
|
| [21] |
习五一(2013). 警惕国际基督教右翼势力的文化渗透. 《马克思主义研究》,(3),67-73.
|
| [22] |
辛静, 单波(2018). 海外英文媒体对“一带一路”倡议的隐喻建构——基于语料库的跨文化比较研究. 《现代传播(中国传媒大学学报)》,(6),36-42.
|
| [23] |
徐翔(2018). “西方中心”与“中介突围”:中国文化在社交媒体国际传播中的区域张力与结构. 《福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,(6),107-119.
|
| [24] |
徐以骅(2020). 宗教新右翼与当前美国的对华政策. 《历史评论》,(1),55-61.
|
| [25] |
杨悦(2014). “占领华尔街”运动与茶党运动的对比分析——政治过程理论视角. 《美国研究》,(3),58-79.
|
| [26] |
张梦晗(2018). 青年网民的互动与沟通:复杂国际环境下的对外传播路径. 《现代传播(中国传媒大学学报)》,(12),24-28.
|
| [27] |
赵永华, 刘娟(2018). 文化认同视角下“一带一路”跨文化传播路径选择. 《国际新闻界》,(12),67-82.
|
| [28] |
|
| [29] |
Social media is altering how some religious leaders communicate with their followers and with the public. This has the potential to challenge theories of religious communication that have been developed through the study of traditional modes such as sermons. This study examines how leaders in U.S. evangelicalism take advantage of the public platform provided by Twitter. Using over 85,000 tweets from 88 prominent evangelical leaders, we find that these leaders often use their social media platforms as a natural extension of their current modes of communication. More specifically, evangelical leaders use their account to encourage and inspire their followers, while also conveying information about upcoming personal projects such as tours and book releases. In a small number of cases, evangelical leaders do make reference to political issues, but those individuals are ones who have already built a brand based on political commentary. Speaking broadly, the usage of political language by evangelical leaders is rare. The paper concludes with a discussion of how this analysis advances theories of religion and communication.KeywordsTwitter – social media – evangelicals – leaders
|
| [30] |
|
| [31] |
|
| [32] |
|
| [33] |
|
| [34] |
|
| [35] |
|
| [36] |
|
| [37] |
|
| [38] |
|
| [39] |
|
| [40] |
|
| [41] |
|
| [42] |
|
| [43] |
|
| [44] |
Insurgent candidates from across the political spectrum are increasingly turning to social media to directly engage the public. Social media offer a platform that favours affect and personality, both key components of populist-style rhetoric, a label that is often attached to politicians outside the political establishment. Despite noteworthy exceptions, few cross-national studies of high-profile candidates’ use of social media exist, and even less is known about how candidates representing various political ideologies employ affect alongside populism. To advance the state-of-the-art, this study examines the sentiment and rhetorical targets of attack in the Twitter feeds ( N = 25,825 tweets) of six presidential candidates in the United States and French election campaigns of 2016 and 2017. Employing dictionary-based quantitative analysis, the study finds variation among the candidates’ rhetoric in terms of how they employ populist themes, affect and ideology. The findings suggest that scholars should consider a more nuanced approach to populism in late-modern democracies.
|
| [45] |
|
| [46] |
Since the 1980s the rise of so-called ‘populist parties’ has given rise to thousands of books, articles, columns and editorials. This article aims to make a threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies. First, a clear and new definition of populism is presented. Second, the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist. Third, it is argued that the explanations of and reactions to the current populist Zeitgeist are seriously flawed and might actually strengthen rather than weaken it.
|
| [47] |
|
| [48] |
Despite the wide application of the label “populist” in the 2016 election cycle, there has been little systematic evidence that this election is distinctive in its populist appeal. Looking at historical trends, contemporary rhetoric, and public opinion data, we find that populism is an appropriate descriptor of the 2016 election and that Donald Trump stands out in particular as the populist par excellence. Historical data reveal a large “representation gap” that typically accompanies populist candidates. Content analysis of campaign speeches shows that Trump, more so than any other candidate, employs a rhetoric that is distinctive in its simplicity, anti-elitism, and collectivism. Original survey data show that Trump’s supporters are distinctive in their unique combination of anti-expertise, anti-elitism, and pronationalist sentiments. Together, these findings highlight the distinctiveness of populism as a mechanism of political mobilization and the unusual character of the 2016 race.
|
| [49] |
|
| [50] |
|
| [51] |
|
| [52] |
|
| [53] |
By focusing on the Facebook activities of eighty-three political leaders from twenty-six Western and Latin American countries, we analyze their reliance on elements of populist communication for their competitive strategies. By integrating both a communication-centered and an actor-centered approach to the study of populism, we tackle four major research questions: Do populist and non-populist leaders adopt similar communication strategies on Facebook? Is there any evidence of the so-called populist zeitgeist in such arena? What different combinations between the so-called three “elements of populist communication” characterize the communication strategies of political leaders on Facebook? Are there major differences between Western and Latin American leaders? The results of our analysis provide an important contribution to the existing literature on populism and political communication in different respects. First, the populist zeitgeist “thesis” does not apply to the communication strategies of political leaders on Facebook. Second, the spread of elements of populist communication in Latin America is considerably lower in comparison with Western countries, irrespective of party ideological background. Finally, this paper identifies all the logical combinations that can occur between the interplay of the different elements of populist communication, thus enabling the classification of the communication strategies employed by political leaders on Facebook.
|
1. 本文所用代码和数据集已开源,使用该数据集无需获得授权,只需将本文列为参考文献。数据集获取地址:
/
| 〈 |
|
〉 |