Messages emphasizing scientific agreement are increasingly used to communicate politically polarizing issues. Proponents argue that these messages neutralize the effect of people’s political worldviews due to the neutral scientific character of the message. Yet this argument has not undergone extensive testing. Addressing this, we measured participants’ thoughts on scientists featured in messages emphasizing scientific agreement on politically dissonant issues. Our results show that readers often produce less favorable thoughts and moral judgments when scientists agree on a politically dissonant issue. As a result, messages emphasizing scientific agreement on politicized issues might not always neutralize the effect of people’s political worldviews.

Against the background that surveys measuring public perceptions of science and technology are often removed from cultural contexts and do not equally represent all regions of the world, this study investigated attitudes towards science and technology among different publics of the South African population. To apply a culture-sensitive approach, theoretical considerations of cultural distance were combined with methodological considerations of segmentation studies, and representative data ( = 3183) were reanalysed. The findings show that six South African publics can be distinguished, and that - despite the fact that all publics see more promises of science than reservations - there tend to be sensitive differences between these publics. In the long run, such findings might help to make science communication more effective.

/ This study investigates latent and manifest dimensions of nationalism and their theoretical and empirical relationships with patterns of media use in the everyday life context of metropolitan China. Data from a face-to-face survey conducted with a random sample of 600 Shanghai residents show that the mass media's appeal to the public perception of nationalism acts effectively and differentially on both event-triggered and banal everyday forms of nationalism. It is also found that attention to news has a direct effect on manifest nationalism, but a largely indirect effect on latent nationalism through specific knowledge, mental complexity, patterns of information processing and interpersonal communication.

Historically, many technologies have been associated with societal controversies, leading to public rejection of their use. It is therefore important to understand the psychological determinants of societal acceptance of emerging technologies. Socio-psychological determinants of public acceptance of 10 (controversial) technologies are reviewed. The results indicate that there has been an increased interest in and focus on public acceptance of technologies in academia. Risk, trust, perceived benefit, knowledge, individual differences and attitude were found to have been a focus of research in 60% of articles. The results of correspondence analysis suggest that some determinants have been used more extensively in association with some technologies compared to others. As the published research has predominantly been conducted in North America and Europe, research across different cultural contexts internationally is required if globally relevant conclusions are to be reached. Implications for future research are discussed.

It has long been assumed that foreign-policy attitudes of the mass public are random, disorganized, and unconstrained if they exist at all. Further, foreign-policy thinking has not been found to be structured along standard ideological (liberal-conservative) lines, partisan lines, or class lines. We attempt to move the discussion from a question of whether foreign-policy attitudes are structured to a question of how they are structured. We propose and estimate (using a LISREL model) a hierarchically organized foreign-policy belief structure in which specific policy preferences are derived from postures (broad, abstract beliefs regarding appropriate general governmental strategies). These postures, in turn, are assumed to be constrained by a set of core values about the international community.

Grid–Group Cultural Theory (CT), developed by Mary Douglas and followers, is a well-known and often-used framework for the analysis of culture in the political–administrative world. Although Douglas herself was rather wary of detailed operationalization of CT, many scholars have tried to measure Grid and Group and tested implications of the theory along these dimensions at different levels of analysis, within or between nations. In this article, we recognize and discuss some grave challenges surrounding the operationalization of Grid and Group, particularly at the cross-national level. Presenting distinct facets of Group and Grid, we debate that in some measurements, divergent and unrelated cultural attributes are used in the operationalization of Grid and Group, making validity and reliability of such operationalization problematic. We also exhibit that Grid and Group cannot cover some cultural variances between or within societies; hence, we introduce and elaborate on a third dimension: “Grade.” We demonstrate that this dimension is missing and much-needed in CT.

This paper seeks to compare two frameworks which have been proposed to explain risk perceptions, namely, cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm. A structured questionnaire which incorporated elements from both approaches was administered to 129 residents of Norwich, England. The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases, though it should be borne in mind that the qualitative characteristics refer directly to risks whereas cultural biases are much more distant variables. Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions were very low, but the key point was that each cultural bias was associated with concern about distinct types of risks and that the pattern of responses was compatible with that predicted by cultural theory. The cultural approach also provided indicators for underlying beliefs regarding trust and the environment; beliefs which were consistent within each world view but divergent between them. An important drawback, however, was that the psychometric questionnaire could only allocate 32% of the respondents unequivocally to one of the four cultural types. The rest of the sample expressed several cultural biases simultaneously, or none at all. Cultural biases are therefore probably best interpreted as four extreme world views, and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies would generate better insights into who might defend these views in what circumstances, whether there are only four mutually exclusive world views or not, and how these views are related to patterns of social solidarity, and judgments on institutional trust.

This article investigates the role of culture in the social production of risks and risk communication surrounding industrial development in a region located at a rural-urban interface. A case study examined a public consultation that was undertaken to inform local residents about an eco-industrial development proposal being planned near Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. The research employed the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) to examine the relationships among culture, place, and socially constructed risk. A total of 44 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 33 landowners (farmers, acreage owners), public officials (municipal politicians, administrators), journalists, and industry representatives. Analysis revealed that risk communication occurred in relation to situated experiences of place that were based on conflicting cultural worldviews. The research shows that place is a useful component of the SARF, providing a spatial explanation for why some people amplify, and others attenuate, risks in locally contentious environmental debates.

The authors present a quantitative content analysis of biotechnology-related coverage appearing in the New York Times and Newsweekbetween 1970 and 1999, examining patterns of media attention and evaluating the source impact of various political and social actors on the themes, frames, and tone of coverage. Although media attention to biotechnology steadily increased across the 1980s and most of the 1990s, it has been highly episodic, peaking and plummeting in response to major scientific announcements. Even in its peak years of coverage, biotechnology still rests rather modestly on the overall media agenda compared with other issues related to science, technology, or popular culture. The character of biotechnology-related coverage has been overwhelmingly positive, with heavy emphasis on the frames of scientific progress and economic prospect. A departure from this trend only occurs in correspondence to the late 1990s debate over cloning, as a greater media emphasis on ethics and controversy emerges.

This study empirically assesses the performance of Holtgrave and Weber's Simplified Conjoint Expected Risk (SCER) model for financial and health stimuli in 3 groups of "worldview holders"-12 hierarchists, 10 individualists, and 16 egalitarians-as described by cultural theory. The SCER model performed well, however, distinctive patterns of model variable selection appeared within each group. Interestingly, the pattern of variable selection paralleled cultural theory's descriptions of each worldview. Differences in the mean perceived risk of activities also tended to correspond to predictions made by cultural theory. Results suggest two mechanisms to explain differences in perceived risk among worldviews: (i) same model variables are evaluated, but given different weight; (ii) different variables are evaluated. Identifying the relevant mechanism for a given situation may enhance the effectiveness of risk communication.

I offer a critique of the cultural cognition thesis. I argue that cultural cognition is not a theory about culture or cognition per se; rather, it is a thesis that aims to explain why specific American groups with opposing political views disagree over a select number of contemporary science issues. I highlight that cultural cognition can be characterized as a “strange loop” as it frequently defines its core theoretical properties (e.g., group, culture, political ideology) in terms of one another. The approach also overgeneralizes specific findings from social psychology and underappreciates the many audiences that comprise the general “public”.

This paper analyses the discursive construction of the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) issue in the Turkish political arena following the public debate on the pending legislation on biosecurity. The study proposes an operational approach to semiotic/actor network theory (Latour) applied to public representations of a new technology within the theoretical frameworks of social representation theory and cultural theory of risks. It aims to highlight how different worldviews produce different risk discourses of GMOs in Turkey. Using cluster analysis to inductively extract evaluative categories, we use these to identify themes by human coding. Lastly, we apply formal concept analysis to link themes to actors and their worldviews, establishing their semantic networks. Formal concept analysis revealed four discourse networks reflecting nationalist, Islamist, progressive (left) and neo-liberal worldviews. Finally, these structures will be grounded back in the articles for a richer interpretive analysis.

Recently, neuroscientists have argued that elementary ways of organizing, perceiving, and justifying social relations lurk behind the diversity of social life. In developing grid-group typology, anthropologist Mary Douglas proposed such universal forms. If these are universal, then we could expect other widely cited classifications to overlap with grid-group typology. We tested this expectation by examining to which extent the elements of Douglas’s typology overlap with those of 39 highly influential classifications proposed since 1970. We established overlap by calculating the interrater agreement among 11 coders. Fair to good interrater agreement, despite a complex coding exercise and minimal training, suggests that such overlap exists. Nevertheless, limits to our research design call for further studies. These findings should contribute to a rekindling of the question whether universal forms of organizing and perceiving social relations exist and to a further consideration of whether Douglas has managed to uncover these.

Based on a survey of Zhejiang University students in Hangzhou, China, this article explores elite students’ political attitudes, especially nationalism. I examine students’ self-identified political orientations, their de facto nationalism (using a three-dimensional model), and the association between students’ media use and nationalistic sentiment.

As the Deng era approaches its end, concern abroad, particularly in East Asia, focuses on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) will cope with territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and India, and the continued quest for Taiwan. Meanwhile Chinese military modernization steadily increases the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea power projection. The question arises: might a beleaguered post-Deng leadership seek to strengthen its legitimacy through exploitation of Chinese nationalism and if so, how would this manifest itself in foreign relations?

Biotechnological innovations prompt a range of societal responses that demand understanding. Research has shown such responses are shaped by individuals’ cultural worldviews. We aim to demonstrate how the Integrative Worldview Framework (IWF) can be used for analyzing perceptions of biotechnology, by reviewing (1) research on public perceptions of biotechnology and (2) analyses of the stakeholder-debate on the bio-based economy, using the Integrative Worldview Framework (IWF) as analytical lens. This framework operationalizes the concept of worldview and distinguishes between traditional, modern, and postmodern worldviews, among others. Applied to these literatures, this framework illuminates how these worldviews underlie major societal responses, thereby providing a unifying understanding of the literature on perceptions of biotechnology. We conclude the IWF has relevance for informing research on perceptions of socio-technical changes, generating insight into the paradigmatic gaps in social science, and facilitating reflexive and inclusive policy-making and debates on these timely issues.

– The aim of this study was to develop a valid and reliable measurement instrument for organizational culture on the basis of grid-group cultural theory (GGCT).

Agricultural biotechnology (genetic modification) has encountered resistance from many consumers, resulting in disparate regulatory approaches across different jurisdictions. The recent advent of CRISPR-Cas9, or gene editing, offers the potential for significant improvements in plant breeding. However, little is known currently about consumer responses to the technology. A factor often omitted from previous economic analyses of consumer acceptance of new food technologies is underlying human values or worldviews. Drawing upon cultural cognition theory and using data from a survey of Canadian consumers, we examine the influence of cultural values on food choice behaviours. Respondents' pre-existing cultural values are measured on two dimensions: hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism. Choice behaviours are captured using a discrete choice experiment featuring a sliced apple product with two consumer-oriented attributes (non-browning and antioxidant-enhanced) and three novel food technologies (gene editing, genetic modification, edible coating). Using a random parameters logit model with error components we find pre-existing cultural values to be significant determinants of choice behaviours. Individuals pre-disposed towards a hierarchical worldview are more accepting of novel food technologies, as are individuals with a communitarian worldview. While the use of gene editing results in negative marginal utilities in a food choice situation, the effect is not as large as with genetic modification, suggesting there is scope to ameliorate potentially negative reactions to the technology with value-compatible messages.

Past research has modeled mass opinion change as a two-step process involving reception of political communication and acceptance or rejection of that communication. I propose a two-message version of the reception-acceptance model, in which citizens are exposed to two opposing communication flows, either or both of which may affect their opinions. Variation over time in the relative intensity of the opposing communications, along with citizen differences in attention to politics and in political values, interact in the model to explain both cross-sectional patterns of mass opinion and opinion change across surveys. The model, which is applied to data on the Vietnam War, illuminates two research problems: how complex information flows diffuse through a mass audience and how this information shapes mass belief systems.

Chinese people have held collectivistic values such as obligation, giving to other people, obedience and sacrifice of personal interests for thousands of years. In recent decades, China has undergone rapid economic development and urbanisation. This study investigates changing cultural values in China from 1970 to 2008 and the relationship of changing values to ecological shifts. The conceptual framework for the study was Greenfield's (2009) theory of social change and human development. Changing frequencies of contrasting Chinese words indexing individualistic or collectivistic values show that values shift along with ecological changes (urbanisation, economic development and enrollment in higher education), thereby adapting to current sociodemographic contexts. Words indexing adaptive individualistic values increased in frequency between 1970 and 2008. In contrast, words indexing less adaptive collectivistic values either decreased in frequency in this same period of time or else rose more slowly than words indexing contrasting individualistic values. © 2015 International Union of Psychological Science.