Task-oriented or Chitchat: The Limitation of Human-Machine Communication and the Choice of Developmental Paths of Chatbots

WANG Yingji, WANG Yuanxin

Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (4) : 30-50.

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Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (4) : 30-50.
Communication Research

Task-oriented or Chitchat: The Limitation of Human-Machine Communication and the Choice of Developmental Paths of Chatbots

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Abstract

The advance of chatbots is evolving the human-machine interaction into the conversational mode, which has also stimulated people’s expectation of barrier-free communication between human and machine. However, when analyzing the essence of human communication, it is not difficult to find that chatbots are unable to develop empathy due to their lack of physical bodies, nor to develop an ontological understanding of the everyday experiences of human beings. The distinct physical differences between human and machine means that angelic communication between them would be barely possible. However, as an intelligent tool with high efficiency, chatbots can satisfy people’s strong demand for technical services, and its application and development prospects are extremely broad. Considering the ethical safety risks and social consequences brought by artificial intelligence, people should try their best to avoid getting involved in the deep social emotional relationship with machines and focus more on their instrumental service functions. Therefore, by recognizing the differences between ideal and reality within the technology myths, people can choose the best way of developing chatbots based on the expected risk prevention and control, and restart the new chapter of human-machine communication.

Key words

chatbot / the Limitation of communication / task-oriented / chitchat / path

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WANG Yingji , WANG Yuanxin. Task-oriented or Chitchat: The Limitation of Human-Machine Communication and the Choice of Developmental Paths of Chatbots[J]. Chinese Journal of Journalism & Communication. 2021, 43(4): 30-50

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Funding

Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education of China in 2020: Husserl’s Thought on Communication and Media Research(20YJA860016)
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